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Face processing: Getting by with a little help from its friends
M.J. Tovée
Functional imaging identified a putative face-specific
area within the fusiform gyrus of human visual cortex;
the precise role of this area is still in question, however,
and recent imaging studies have implicated other cortical
areas in face processing. These studies show the
dangers of considering a single cortical area in isolation.
Address: Department of Psychology, Ridley Building, Newcastle
University, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK.
E-mail: m.j.tovee@ncl.ac.uk
Current Biology 1998, 8:R317–R320
http://biomednet.com/elecref/09609822008R0317
© Current Biology Ltd ISSN 0960-9822
Functional imaging techniques have made it possible to
map the neural substrates of human visual perception [1].
One example that has attracted a lot of attention is the
identification of an area in the fusiform gyrus as one specifi-
cally concerned with face recognition [2,3]. Activation by
faces could, however, simply reflect the working of a
general object-processing system: just how specific to faces
is this putative ‘face-specific’ area? McCarthy et al. [4]
recently reasoned that, if faces were processed separately by
the visual system, then if a face were seen at a time while
the object-recognition system is already occupied with pro-
cessing a number of other objects, an additional cortical area
should be activated, and in principle this additional activa-
tion should be detectable using current imaging tech-
niques. But if faces were processed by the general
object-recognition system, then no such additional activa-
tion should ‘pop out’. To test this hypothesis, McCarthy et
al. [4] used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to measure the activation evoked by faces, compared with
flowers, presented in the middle of a continuously changing
montage of either common objects or ‘scrambled’ objects. 
McCarthy et al. [4] were really making two comparisons.
The first was between activation induced by the faces
under the two montage conditions. It was assumed that the
scrambled objects would not stimulate the higher object-
recognition areas, but would act as controls for stimulus
features, such as luminance and spatial frequency. So, seen
amongst the scrambled object montage, the faces should
activate areas which process them both as a unique pattern
— processed by the putative face-recognition area — and
as a collection of shapes which make up a face —
processed by part of the general object-processing system.
Presented amongst the object montage, the faces should
stimulate the face-processing area, which should not have
been activated by the object montage alone. The part of
the general object-processing system that is stimulated by
faces as a collection of objects should already be activated
by the montage of objects, so the only new area of activa-
tion should be that specific to processing faces. 
The second comparison was between the patterns of
activation in response to faces versus that evoked by
flowers. It was assumed that flowers would be processed
solely by the general object-recognition system, rather
than by a specific ‘flower recognition area’. So showing
flowers amongst the scrambled montage should stimulate
activation of parts of the general object-processing system,
but showing them against the object montage should
produce no difference in activation, as the general object-
processing system should be already fully activated. 
The results obtained by McCarthy et al. [4] seem to be
consistent with this set of predictions. Bilateral regions of
the fusiform gyrus were activated by faces viewed
amongst the scrambled object montage, but when viewed
amongst the object montage, the faces differentially acti-
vated a focal region in the right fusiform region. Flowers
amongst scrambled objects also caused bilateral activation,
but did not cause any additional activation when pre-
sented amongst the object montage. This suggested that
face recognition involves a specialized region which is
evident when the general object-recognition system is
active. The preferential activation of the right side is con-
sistent with results from behavioural, clinical and electro-
physiological studies [5,6], which all suggest that
recognition of a face as a unique pattern is mediated by
the right side of the brain. Recognition by the left side of
the brain occurs by piecemeal processing of the compo-
nents that make up the face, rather than of the whole
image as a single coherent pattern.
A problem for functional imaging studies of face
processing arises from their methodology. In attempting to
map the putative face-specific area, many researchers have
compared the effects of passively presented faces with
those of non-face objects or faces with their features
rearranged. This does not take into account the role of
attention and active processing in the recognition process.
Even in those studies in which the subjects had to perform
an active discrimination task, the tendency was to provide
a choice between faces and non-face objects. Although
addressing the problem of attention and active stimulus
processing to a certain extent, these studies may also be
flawed as they are not within-category discriminations. 
The function of a face-specific area will surely be to
discriminate between different faces — ‘within-category’
discrimination — rather than between faces and other
objects — ‘between-category’ discrimination. Furthermore,
it has been argued that faces and the non-face objects used
as controls — such as dogs, flowers or cars —are processed
in qualitatively different ways [7]. For example, if I see a
dog, I can tell you it is a dog, but I cannot tell you its gender,
age, emotional state, whether I have ever seen it before, or
anything else about it, whereas if I see a face, I automati-
cally unpack that information and more. So it can be argued
that viewing faces and non-faces are very different tasks.
We process faces in far more detail and depth than the com-
monly used controls, and the use of these controls may give
a misleading impression. The differences in the pattern of
activation between a face and a non-face object may not
reflect the existence of a specific face area, rather the depth
of processing and the amount of information that can be
derived from a face as compared with a non-face control.
These objections can be at least partially overcome if, for
the controls, subjects are asked to perform within-category
discrimination tasks, such as the one used by Kanwisher et
al. [8]. In a series of tests, these authors identified an area of
the fusiform gyrus that became active during face process-
ing. They then concentrated on the activity of this area.
They asked subjects to perform two sets of discrimination
tasks, the first between different faces and the second
between different hands. In both tasks, the subject had to
attend very closely to the stimuli and unpack details of each
stimulus on which to make a within-category discrimination.
They found activation of the region corresponding to the
putative face-specific module when discriminating between
faces, but not when discriminating between hands. This
suggests that activation of the proposed face area is not an
artifact of attention or the level of processing, but represents
processing by an area of cortex specific to faces.
On the basis of single-cell recording and optical imaging
studies in the primate inferotemporal cortex (IT), Tanaka
and colleagues [9] have argued that only faces have a spe-
cific class of neurons tuned to them as complex three-
dimensional shapes. According to their ‘visual alphabet
theory’, all other objects are represented by a distributed
code across cells responsive to simple two-dimensional
shapes. Alternatively, other classes of cells in the IT may
be tuned to respond to complex three-dimensional
objects. Evidence for this hypothesis has come from a
study by Logothetis et al. [10], in which monkeys were
trained to discriminate between complex, abstract three-
dimensional shapes. The authors found that some IT
neurons developed an object and view selectivity similar
to the selectivity of face cells for faces. According to this
view, face cells would still occur in a discrete area as a part
of the object-processing system. 
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, assume that faces in
humans can be processed in one of two ways. There may
be a face-specific processing system that works in parallel
with a general object-recognition system, in which objects
are encoded by the activation of cells responsive to the
simple two-dimensional shapes that make up an object.
Alternatively, there may be a single object-recognition
system which sub-divides into separate modules, each of
which is preferentially responsive to a particular class of
complex three-dimensional stimuli. Functional imaging of
the cortical activity evoked in response to a face will not
differentiate between these two possibilities, as activation
of a discrete area of cortex would be consistent with either
theory. To distinguish between the two theories, one
needs to look not at how faces are processed, but how non-
face stimuli are processed. Do general objects activate the
whole object-recognition system in a diffuse manner, or do
they activate a specific area according to their class? 
Deciding between these possibilities is not a trivial task as,
like faces, non-face objects will also stimulate cells respon-
sive to similar objects or to components of the object.
Moreover, these non-face stimuli need to be chosen care-
fully. Face recognition and discrimination are difficult
tasks and we have developed extensive neural machinery
to deal with them. If one uses a set of non-face objects —
such as dogs or flowers — which most of us have no great
ability to make fine discriminations between, then the
underlying neural machinery will not be well developed.
Consequently, functional imaging, which still has a limited
R318 Current Biology, Vol 8 No 9
Figure 1
Examples of pictures used in determining the
neural substrates of fear. These are computer-
transformed pictures ranging from a neutral
expression to a very fearful expression.
(Modified by D.I. Perrett and D. Rowland from
an image series provided by Paul Ekman.)
spatial resolution, will not tell us very much. To answer
this question, functional imaging has to be used on experts
making a visual discrimination in their specialty, such as a
judge at Crufts discriminating between individual dogs of
the same breed, or a judge at the Chelsea flower show
judging the quality of a particular variety of rose.
Updating face recognition
Criticisms have been made of the poor spatial and tempo-
ral resolution of functional imaging techniques. One of the
strong points of these techniques, however, is that they
allow simultaneous monitoring of the activity of the whole
cortex. One can then determine how different areas inter-
act to mediate visual perception in a particular situation.
An interesting example is perceptual learning. When
faced with the task of reconstructing meaningful objects
out of fragmentary or ambiguous visual evidence, naive
subjects often experience a long latency before the object
is recognized. But once the subjects have been exposed to
an unambiguous version of the same object, even the
ambiguous version of the stimulus can be recognized
almost instantly [11]. This is a striking example of rapid
perceptual learning, which seems to be implemented by
modifying the responses of neurons in the visual system. 
If one records from IT neurons in a monkey performing
the task outlined above, one finds that face-selective
neurons do not initially respond to an ambiguous face, but,
once they have seen the face in an unambiguous situation,
they give an enhanced response to subsequent presenta-
tions of the ambiguous face [11]. The responses of the
neurons thus mirror the responses of the observer. A
recent positron emission tomography (PET) study of
human subjects performing a similar task also found
enhanced activity in the anterior fusiform gyrus when the
ambiguous image was viewed after cueing by an unam-
biguous image [12]. This area corresponds to the face area
discussed above, and the enhanced activity is consistent
with changes in the response properties of neurons in this
area having occurred during perceptual learning. 
In the human PET experiment, activity was also observed
in the lateral parietal cortex and, during the learning phase
of the experiment, the medial parietal cortex [12].
Damage to the lateral parietal cortex causes severe impair-
ment of spatial attention and feature ‘binding’ [13] — the
process by which different features of an object, such as its
shape and colour, are ‘bound’ together after separate pro-
cessing — and the medial parietal cortex has been impli-
cated in memory-related imagery [14]. It seems logical
that these areas should be involved in the reconstruction
of a face from fragmentary sensory information. The
lateral parietal cortex would play an important role in
assembling a recognizable image from the disjointed parts
of the ambiguous image, and the medial parietal cortex
might provide a template or plan on which to base this
construction. These interactions between the parietal
areas and fusiform gyrus lead to a long-term, possibly per-
manent, change in the response properties of the neurons
in the fusiform gyrus, facilitating subsequent recognition
of the ambiguous image.
Decoding facial expressions
Visual perception is not used just to identify a face — in
humans, facial expressions provide one of the most
important sources of social information. The region of the
temporal lobe known as the amygdala is intimately
involved in the interpretation of facial expression. Consis-
tent with this theory, a 30-year-old woman (S.M.) who had
a selective bilateral lesion of the amygdala was found to be
impaired in her ability to recognize fearful expressions
[15]. Humans are normally very good at detecting subtle
mixtures of expressions, such as happy and surprised, but
S.M. was also impaired in her ability to detect such
blends, suggesting that the amygdala has a role in the res-
olution of fine nuances in expression.
Further evidence that the amygdala has a role in the
decoding of facial expression comes from functional
imaging studies. A recent PET study [16] showed
increased amygdala activity in normal subjects in response
to photographs of fearful expressions, but not to happy
expressions. The degree of activation was proportional to
the intensity of the fearful expression (Figure 1). An
extremely fearful face activated the amygdala more
strongly than a less fearful face. As the intensity of the
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Figure 2
Examples of the pictures used in determining
the neural substrates of disgust. These are
computer-transformed pictures ranging from a
neutral expression to a very disgusted
expression. (Modified by D.I. Perrett and D.
Rowland from an image series provided by
Paul Ekman.)
expression was reduced, so the strength of the amygdala
activity fell. Interestingly, amygdala damage also impairs
the recognition of fear in voices, emphasizing the polysen-
sory role of the amygdala in linking perceived emotion
with interpretation [17]. 
The impaired ability of S.M. to recognize emotion in facial
expressions seems to be a developmental effect. Two adult
men who had survived herpes simplex encephalitis with
complete bilateral lesions of the amygdala and other tempo-
ral lobe structures were tested on the same set of experi-
ments and found to have a normal ability to recognize facial
expressions of emotion, including fear [18]. The main dif-
ference between these two cases and S.M. seems to be the
timing of the amygdala damage. The two men had their
lesions late in life — after 50 years of age — whereas S.M.,
who suffers from a congenital condition, had her lesion
early in life. It seems, therefore, that to significantly impair
recognition of facial expression, damage to the amygdala
must occur during development. Our own feelings of
emotion are linked to the perception of particular facial
expression, and this connection helps us learn to discrimi-
nate between, and grade the intensity of, facial expressions.
Once we have learnt the meaning of an expression, there-
fore, we need not feel the emotion normally linked to an
expression to recognize it. Thus, damage to the adult amyg-
dala may not impair our recognition of an expression, but it
does seem to impair our emotional reaction to it.
The role of the amygdala in the processing of other facially
conveyed emotions is less clear. An fMRI study has shown
that there does not seem to be significant activation in
response to happy expressions, and response to expres-
sions of disgust (Figure 2) appears to occur in an adjacent
area, the anterior insular [19]. The insular has been identi-
fied as the gustatory cortex in primates and plays an impor-
tant role in the appreciation of both tastes and odours.
This suggests that the appreciation of visual stimuli
depicting others’ disgust may be closely linked to the per-
ception of potentially aversive stimuli [19]. This apparent
separation of the neural mechanisms for the perception of
fear and disgust can be explained in terms of their differ-
ent evolutionary functions: fear can be seen as part of a
mechanism for the detection and appraisal of danger and
threat, whereas disgust plays a role in the determination of
the risk of contamination and disease [20].
The face-recognition network
The recognition of faces in the human cerebral cortex is
mediated by a discrete region of the fusiform gyrus, but the
function of this area is dependent on interactions with other
cortical areas. Damage to the fusiform gyrus that includes
the area mediating face recognition can lead to prosopag-
nosia — an inability to recognize faces — and damage to
the amygdala can lead to problems in social integration.
The role of the perception of disgust is less well known and
understood. It is known, however, that people suffering
from obsessive–compulsive disorder also seem to suffer
from an impairment of the perception of disgust [20].
Obsessive–compulsive disorder seems to have its genesis in
childhood, and it is possible that the failure to pick up social
cues relating to items or activities that normally generate
disgust leads to the development of aberrant social behav-
iours, such as the washing or checking rituals observed in
obsessive–compulsive disorder. These results emphasize
the importance of being able to correctly process facially
conveyed information for a very social primate such as our-
selves, and the difficulties which can arise when the neural
systems underlying this ability go wrong.
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